## 1NC

### 1NC - Kritik

The Buddha was sitting at a festival of joy, where families celebrated their life and health. However, as he watched the procession, he realized the joy of these families was invariably connected to the trampling of ants.   
Similar to those ants, black being provides the structural support for a bridge of desire over which flows the everyday unreality of the sovereign -- debates over antitrust laws are inseparable from desire for cartographic coherence that drives the myth of transcendental control over space-time.

**Moten ’13** [Fred; 2013; Professor of Performance Studies at New York University; *Blackness and Nothingness: (Mysticism in the Flesh)*, “Just Friends,” p. 749-752]

Within this framework blackness and antiblackness remain in brutally antisocial structural support of one another like the stanchions of an absent bridge of lost desire over which flows the commerce and under which flows the current, the logistics and energy of exclusion and incorporation, that characterizes the political world. Though it might seem paradoxical, the bridge between blackness and antiblackness is “the unbridgeable gap between Black being and Human life” (Wilderson 2010: 57). What remains is the necessity of an attempt to index black existence by way of what Chandler (2007: 41) would call para ontological, rather than politico-ontological, means. The relative nothingness of black life, which shows up for political ontology as a relation of nonrelation or counterrelation precisely in the impossibility of political intersubjectivity, can be said both to obscure and to indicate the social animation of the bridge’s underside, where the im/possibilities of political intersubjectivity are exhausted. Political ontology backs away from the experimental declivity that Fanon and Du Bois were at least able to blaze, each in his own way forging a sociological path that would move against the limiting force, held in the ontological traces, of positivism, on the one hand, and phenomenology, on the other, as each would serve as the foundation of a theory of relations posing the nothingness of blackness in its (negative) relation to the substance of subjectivity-as-nonblackness (enacted in antiblackness). On the one hand, blackness and ontology are unavailable for one another; on the other hand, blackness must free itself from ontological expectation, must refuse subjection to ontology’s sanction against the very idea of black subjectivity. This imperative is not something up ahead, to which blackness aspires; it is the labor, which must not be mistaken for Sisyphean, that blackness serially commits. The paraontological distinction between blackness and blacks allows us no longer to be enthralled by the notion that blackness is a property that belongs to blacks (thereby placing certain formulations regarding non/relationality and non/communicability on a different footing and under a certain pressure) but also because ultimately it allows us to detach blackness from the question of (the meaning of) being. The infinitesimal difference between pessimism and optimism lies not in the belief or disbelief in descriptions of power relations or emancipatory projects; the difference is given in the space between an assertion of the relative nothingness of blackness and black people in the face, literally, of substantive (antiblack) subjectivity and an inhabitation of appositionality, its internal social relations, which remain unstructured by the protocols of subjectivity insofar as mu—which has been variously translated from the Japanese translation of the Chinese wu as no, not, nought, nonbeing, emptiness, nothingness, nothing, no thing but which also bears the semantic trace of dance, therefore of measure given in walking/falling, that sustenance of asymmetry, difference’s appositional mobility—also signifies an absolute nothingness whose antirelative and antithetical philosophical content is approached by way of Nishida Kitaro¯’s enactment of the affinities between structures and affects of mysticism that undergird and trouble metaphysics in the “East” and the “West.” Indeed, the content that is approached is approach, itself, and for the absolute beginner, who is at once pilgrim and penitent, mu signals that which is most emphatically and lyrically marked in Édouard Glissant’s phrase “consent not to be a single being” and indicated in Wilderson’s and Mackey’s gestures toward “fantasy in the hold,” the radical unsettlement that is where and what we are. Unsettlement is the displacement of sovereignty by initiation, so that what’s at stake—here, in displacement—is a certain black incapacity to desire sovereignty and ontological relationality whether they are recast in the terms and forms of a Lévinasian ethics or an Arendtian politics, a Fanonian resistance or a Pattersonian test of honor.

Unenabled by or in this incapacity, Nishida’s philosophy folds sovereignty in the delay that has always given it significance, putting it on hold, but not in the hold, where to be on hold is to have been committed to a kind of staging, a gathering of and for the self in which negation is supposed to foster true emergence in “a self-determination of that concrete place of the contradictory identity of objectivity and subjectivity” (Nishida 1987: 96). What I term, here, a delay is understood by Nishida as “the moment [that] can be said to be eternal . . . [wherein] consciously active individuals, encounter the absolute as its inverse polarity, its mirror opposite, at each and every step of our lives” (96). It is in echoing a traditional Buddhist teaching, which asserts the nonself even against what are considered foolish declarations of the nonexistence of self, that Nishida restages a standard ontotheological skit in which sovereignty—whether in the form of the consciously active indi-vidual or in that individual’s abstract and equivalent dispersion in the nation, “the mirror image of the Pure Land in this world” (123)—takes and holds the space-time, the paradoxically transcendental ground, of the everyday unreality of “the real world,” where the sovereign’s endless show carries a brutally material imposition. What remains to be seen is what (the thinking and the study of) blackness can bring to bear on the relation between the un/real world and its other(s). What if blackness is the refusal to defer to, given in the withdrawal from the eternal delay of, sovereignty? What if Nishida’s preparatory vestibule for a general and infinite self-determination is pierced, rather than structurally supported, by (the very intimation of) the no-place to which it is opposed in his own work? When Nishida argues that “the human, consciously active volitional world makes its appearance from the standpoint of the paradoxical logic of the Prajnaparamita Sutra literature,” which offers us the phrase “Having No Place wherein it abides, this Mind arises,” he means to assert the legitimacy of an idea or image of the whole that takes “the form of the contradictory identity of the consciously active self and the world, of the volitional individual and the absolute” (95–96). What if (the thinking and the study of) blackness is an inhabitation of the hold that disrupts the whole in which the absolute, or absolute nothingness, is structured by its relation to its relative other? What if the nothing that is in question here moves through to the other side of negation, in “the real presence” of blackness, in and as another idea of nothingness altogether that is given in and as and to things?

Both against the grain and by way of Fanon’s negation of the condition of relative nothingness, which is instantiated in what he takes to be the white man’s manufacture of the black, black study is attunement of and toward blackness as the place where something akin to the absolute nothingness that Nishida elaborates and a radical immanence of things that is not disavowed so much as it is unimagined in that same elaboration converge. This is to say that what remains unimagined by Nishida—not simply radical thingliness but its convergence with nothingness—is, nevertheless, made open to us by and in his thinking. Nishida helps prepare us to consider, even in the nationalist divigation of his own engagement with the heart of a teaching that has no center, that blackness is the place that has no place. “Having no place where it abides, this Mind [of the Little Negro Steelworker] arises.”1 Things are in, but they do not have, a world, a place, but it is precisely both the specificity of having neither world nor place and the generality of not having that we explore at the nexus of openness and confinement, internment and flight. Having no place wherein they abide, in the radically dispossessive no-place of the hold, in “Mutron,” Cherry and Blackwell touch intimacy from the walls. In that break, the architectonic intent of the hold as sovereign expression and recuperation breaks down. Feel the complete lysis of this morbid body/universe. Touch is not where subjectivity and objectivity come together in some kind of self-determining dialectical reality; beyond that, in the hold, in the basho (the place of nothingness, that underground, undercommon recess), is the social life of black things, which passeth (the) understanding. In the hold, blackness and imagination, in and as consent not to be a single being, are (more and less than) one.

We are prepared for this generative incapacity by Wilderson’s work, where what distinguishes the sovereign, the settler, and even the savage from the slave is precisely that they share “a capacity for time and space coherence. At every scale—the soul, the body, the group, the land, and the universe—they can both practice cartography, and although at every scale their maps are radically incompatible, their respective ‘mapness’ is never in question. This capacity for cartographic coherence is the thing itself, that which secures subjectivity for both the Settler and the ‘Savage’ and articulates them to one another in a network of connections, transfers and displacements” (Wilderson 2010: 181). Absent the “cartographic coherence [that] is the thing itself,” we must become interested in things, in a certain relationship between thingliness and nothingness and blackness that plays itself out—outside and against the grain of the very idea of self-determination—in the unmapped and unmappable immanence of undercommon sociality. This is fantasy in the hold, and Wilderson’s access to it is in the knowledge that he can have nothing and in the specific incapacity of a certain desire that this knowledge indexes. It remains for us to structure an accurate sense of what nothing is and what it constitutes in the exhaustion of home, intersubjectivity, and what Sexton calls “ontological reach” (Sexton 2011a). The truth of the formulation that the black cannot be among or in relation to his or her own is given in terminological failure. What’s at stake is how to improvise the declension from what is perceived as a failure to be together to the unmappable zone of paraontological consent. The promise of another world, or of the end of this one, is given in the general critique of world. In the meantime, what remains to be inhabited is nothing itself in its fullness, which is, in the absence of intersubjective relationality, high fantastical or, more precisely, given in the fugal, contrapuntal intrication that we can now call, by way of Mackey and Wilderson, fantasy in the hold, where the interplay of blackness and nothingness is given in an ongoing drama of force and entry.

#### MSU’s demand for durable fiat is a form of white delusion that represents an active misapprehension of reality -- there is an epistemic imperative to dismantle this anti-black social practice.

**McRae ’19** [Emily; May 13; Associate Professor of Buddhism at the University of New Mexico; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 1,” p. 44-45]

I offer this story not only as an example of everyday white delusion, but also to set the tone of this chapter: From both the Buddhist and critical race theoretical perspectives that I draw on here, ignorance (delusion) is not someone else’s problem. There is a moral, and epistemic imperative to confront our own ignorance, to dismantle the false beliefs and misunderstandings that inform our everyday sense of reality. In this chapter, I use the Buddhist concept of avidyā (ignorance, confusion, delusion) to analyze the causes, mechanisms, and possible correctives for white delusion. In Buddhist contexts, avidyā refers not only to a lack of knowledge but also (and primarily) to an active misapprehension of reality, a warped projection onto reality that reinforces our own dysfunction and vice. Ignorance is rarely innocent; it is not an isolated phenomenon of just-not-happening-to-know-something. It is maintained and reinforced through personal and social habits, including practices of personal and collective false projection, strategic ignoring, and convenient “forgetting.” This view of avidyā has striking similarities to philosophical analyses of white ignorance, such as Charles Mills’s, which understand white ignorance not in terms of a passive lack of knowledge but as an active refusal by whites to confront basic facts about our social world.

I argue that Buddhist analyses of avidyā may help us understand the mechanisms of white ignorance and the practices for deconstructing it. On the Buddhist view, the mechanisms for maintaining avidyā include obsession with self and clinging to fixed narratives about the self (in the case of white delusion, “I’m not racist” or “I’ve earned and deserve everything I have”) and the refusal to take seriously cause and effect (such as a failure to historicize racism, the failure to understand broad, systemic effects of racism, and the inability to apply abstract knowledge of racism to specific cases). In my own case of white delusion, I was guilty of both kinds of mistakes: I was clinging to a narrative that obscured reality—that it was only women who bore the burden of managing physical appearance in our society—and I failed to apply my knowledge of how racism works in the abstract to the specifics of my partner’s life.  
Buddhist conceptions of ignorance or delusion may also help to locate possible correctives for white ignorance. Because avidyā is not simply a lack of knowledge, it cannot be completely remedied by exposure to facts and analyses of those facts. To be receptive to such knowledge in the first place, to remember and apply it, we must overcome our own dysfunctional emotional patterns that sustain our confusion. So, on a Buddhist ethical view, white people cannot combat white ignorance simply with knowledge about racism (which is already widely available) but rather white people need to do the personal and emotional work of deconstructing our own whiteness, as it arises in our own lives, to uproot our white ignorance. This is uncomfortable and ugly (but necessary) work that will require white people to correct for major moral blind spots by developing the moral skill of equanimity (or “tarrying,” as George Yancy has argued).3

#### Absent confronting MSU’s delusion, debaters are trained in an epistemology of ignorance based in avidyā. Avidyā is NOT a “passive absence” BUT an “active delusion” which means any 2AC permutation sustains policy debates habitual ignorance in disguise -- a sound philosophical analysis upends the 1AC’s fantasyland complicit in racial injustice AND provides liberation from the root of all suffering.

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Epistemologies of ignorance are of central importance in Buddhist philosophy, especially Buddhist ethics, and much philosophical effort is given to ethical and epistemological analyses of ignorance. According to all forms of Buddhism, ignorance—or avidyā—is at the root of human suffering, violence, and vice. The project of liberation is, essentially, liberation from avidyā. For these reasons, understanding what avidyā is, how it manifests, the mechanisms for creating and maintaining it, and the spiritual technologies to eliminate it are of central concern to Buddhist philosophers.

In Sanskrit, avidyā is a negation (“a”) of vidyā (knowledge). For this reason, avidyā has often been translated as ignorance, the lack of knowledge. In his survey of Indian Buddhist conceptions of avidyā, Bimal Matilal argues that such an English translation is, at best, misleading for two main reasons, one grammatical and the other philosophical. The grammatical reason is that, although the negation “a” can mean “lack” or “absence,” it can also mean, among other things, “that which is not X,” “that which is in opposition to X,” or “that which is similar, but not equivalent to X.” In the case of avidyā, these different grammatical interpretations lead to substantial philosophical differences: (1) avidyā could be “lack of knowledge,” (2) that which is “noknowledge,” (3) that which is “the opposite of knowledge,” or (4) that which is “mistaken for knowledge.”12

In the context of Buddhist philosophy, the first two possible understandings of avidyā are ruled out: avidyā cannot mean simply that which is not knowledge or the lack of knowledge (which is why both Matilal and Wayman argue against “ignorance” as a suitable translation of avidyā). In the Abhidharmakośa, the fourth-century Buddhist philosopher Vasubhandu asks, “What is avidyā?” His answer

The non-vidyā (knowledge), that which is not vidyā. Impossible; for the eye is also non-vidyā. It is an absence of vidyā, “ignorance.” This is also impossible, for an absence is not a thing and avidyā must be a thing, since it is a cause. Thus, Avidyā is a separate entity (dharma), the opposite of vidyā or knowledge, like a non-friend, the untrue, etc. The non-friend (amitra) is the opposite of friend, not a non-friend, that is, anyone other than a friend, not the absence of the friend . . . . Thus avidyā is the opposite of vidyā.13

Here Vasubhandu is arguing that defining avidyā as simply “non-knowledge” will not do, since there are many things that are not knowledge—such as the eye—but that does not mean that they are avidyā. Moreover, understanding avidyā as the lack or absence of knowledge is “impossible” in the context of Buddhist philosophy. This is because avidyā is causally efficacious; it is one of the root causes of suffering. And a non-entity, according to Vasubhandu, cannot be a cause. For this reason, Vasubhandu claims that we should understand avidyā as that which is opposed to knowledge. (Alex Wayman argued, along these lines, that we should translate avidyā as “unwisdom.”14) It is important to note that, philosophically, understanding avidyā as “that which is opposed to knowledge” includes the other grammatical interpretation of avidyā as “that which is mistaken for knowledge,” since false views that are mistaken for knowledge are in opposition to knowledge.

Analyses of avidyā are prioritized because avidyā is claimed by all Buddhist schools to be a foundational cause of suffering, which is why it is important to Vasubhandu that avidyā has causal efficacy. The link between avidyā and suffering is also important for moral psychological reasons: it explains our experience of suffering in the world and the psychological mechanisms of that suffering. Along with desire and hatred, avidyā is one of the three root “poisons” (and the most foundational of the three) that cause suffering. The basic idea is that our experiences of suffering—from minor dissatisfaction to abject misery—can be explained by our habit of projecting false views and assumptions and taking them to be real or accurate. For Buddhist philosophers, this is true on a mundane level: If I am upset because I was passed over for a promotion, this suffering is due to craving the promotion, aversion to being passed over, both of which are based on false ideas about the nature of reality (that getting overlooked never happens, that promotions are to be valued over other things, etc.). But it is also true on a deeper level. The suffering I experience in my life, it is claimed, is caused by a more fundamental delusion: that I am an independent, essential self, metaphysically distinct from other independent, essential selves. But we do not exist in this way, Buddhists argue; we are simply a collection of ever-changing parts, which are dependent on changing conditions, and are themselves empty of any inherent existence. Not recognizing this is avidyā. Because avidyā causes us to expect and desire things to be other than they are, it sets us up for suffering.

Since it is the fundamental cause of suffering, the elimination of avidyā is central to the Buddhist project of liberation, that is, the cessation of suffering. But the elimination of avidyā cannot simply be about attaining knowledge. This would be true if we understood avidyā as a lack of knowledge; then the antidote would simply be getting more knowledge.15 But since avidyā is better understood as that which stands in opposition to knowledge, as Vasubhandu argues, the elimination of avidyā demands that we actively dismantle these misunderstandings of the world and replace them with accurate understandings that we have reached through sound philosophical analysis and correct interpretation of experience.

There are some obvious differences between avidyā and white ignorance. Avidyā affects all non-liberated beings (that is, all beings who suffer), white ignorance does not affect everyone (although, as Mills notes, it is not strictly limited to white people). The elimination of avidyā constitutes a complete cessation from suffering, or at least that is what is claimed; the elimination of white ignorance constitutes the cessation of, at most, racial injustice, and even then, probably not all of it.

But there are some substantial points of conceptual overlap between avidyā and white ignorance that can motivate integrating Buddhist and critical race analyses. First, both avidyā and white ignorance are normative (broadly moral) concepts of ignorance. Avidyā has moral significance due to its direct link to human (and sentient) suffering. Moreover, the reason that we care about avidyā is for liberatory ends.16 White ignorance is also a moral ignorance. Mills argues that white ignorance is “not merely ignorance of facts with moral implications but moral non-knowings, incorrect judgments about the rights and wrongs of moral situations themselves.”17 And we want to eliminate white ignorance because we want to eliminate the racial injustice and suffering that is caused by it.

Second, due to their normative orientations, both avidyā and white ignorance are intended to pick out certain kinds of morally and soteriologically important delusions; neither concept is concerned with all forms of notknowing. Matilal argues that, even though “in a general context, avidyā may stand for false beliefs or a false belief-system which we all grow up with in the worldly environment,” in the Buddhist context, “it obtains a specialized meaning” because “not all false beliefs are technically called avidyā in Buddhism.”18 The reason that not all false beliefs count as avidyā is because not all false beliefs are implicated in human and sentient suffering and bondage. In most circumstances, the fact that I do not know how many pebbles there are in my yard, or that I assume there are more than there are, does not constitute a cause of my (or others’) suffering. Similarly, the domain of white ignorance is limited: it is not about all the things white people do not know, but what white people do not know qua white people in a white supremacy. That a white person does not know the distance between the Earth and Saturn does not count as the relevant form of white ignorance, since this not-knowing is not due to being a white person in a white supremacist society and it is not a moral nonknowing. That a white person believes “that the academy is a meritocracy, that modernity begins in Europe and then spread outward, and that global poverty is disconnected from Western wealth” would count as white ignorance since the miscognitions are due to being a white person and, because they obscure the realities of racial injustice, it is a moral non-knowing.

The third point of similarity is that Buddhist accounts of avidyā and critical race accounts of white ignorance both emphasize the active dimensions of ignorance. Both insist that the ignorance in question is not a passive absence but an active delusion that is maintained through effort. It is an “active production” that is maintained for personal, social, political, and economic reasons.20 Because both avidyā and white ignorance are active projections of falsity, I will translate avidyā as delusion and change “white ignorance” to “white delusion.” I think that the term white delusion is in line with many of the descriptions found in critical race theory/critical philosophy of race. Mills, who tends to use “white ignorance,” nevertheless sometimes describes it as an “invented delusional world, a racial fantasyland, a consensual hallucination.”21 In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine how Buddhist analyses of delusion (avidyā) help to further understand the causes and conditions of white delusion, and the possibility of eliminating it.

#### Antitrust law incorrectly assumes a closed economic system defined by market rationality and inherent competition—that paradigm ensures planetary immiseration and unhappiness.

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The definition of happiness needs further clarification. In the Buddhist view, which generally corresponds to those of other spiritual traditions, happiness is not simply sensory pleasure, derived from physical comfort. Rather, happiness is an innate state of mind which can be cultivated through spiritual practice, overcoming mental and emotional states which induce suffering. In the Buddhist tradition this is a path of ‘liberation’; other spiritual traditions call it self-transformation. This definition of happiness is absent from conventional western sciences, on which modern economic theory is based. In fact, conventional economics and its indicators such as GNP, deliberately leave human happiness outside its spectrum, tacitly assuming that material development, as measured by GNP growth, is positively correlated to human well-being. Further analysis of the relationship between material development and human psychology has been outside the scope of economic and social theory.

Yet this is changing: breakthrough research – in quantum physics, medicine, biology, behavioral science, psychology and cognitive science – is now making the science of the mind relevant to economics. Conversely, as the current discussion on GNH indicates, from within the profession of economics, attempts are made to broaden the scope of economics into the domain of psychology.

While this allows us to find a common basis for GDP and GNH, it is important to note that this change constitutes a paradigm shift in our thinking. GNP and GNH are rooted in very different (and even opposing) views we have of the world and ourselves. Once we recognize this, we can embark on a coherent journey finding the possible content and meaning of GNH. So let’s first review the foundations of GNH and GNP, respectively.

Buddhism

Buddhism is based on teachings of Gautama Buddha who lived 2500 years ago in ancient India. One of his key teachings is that suffering is caused by the way we perceive things and ourselves. Things appear to us as if they have the ability to provide us lasting happiness and comfort, so we become attached to them and we develop desire for them. But this craving is a result of ignorance about reality. The reality of things is that they are transient, impermanent, and therefore cannot produce the lasting happiness that we expect from them.

Buddhism does not reject matter and wealth as inherently evil, but considers them useful. First, material wealth prevents us from poverty and, second, it allows us to practice generosity; which causes ‘merit’ or positive karma, and a more happy society for all. Thus, “right livelihood” is one of the eight main requirements of the Buddha’s path, which has been defined as follows:

One should abstain from making one’s living through a profession that brings harm to others, such as trading in arms and lethal weapons, intoxicating drinks, poisons, killing animals, cheating etc., and one should live by a profession which is honorable, blameless and innocent of harm to others.1

A true Buddhist person not only seeks wealth lawfully and spends it for the good, but also enjoys spiritual freedom. The Buddhist Pali canon states that such person acts as follows2:

Seeking wealth lawfully and unarbitrarily

Making oneself happy and cheerful

Sharing with others and doing meritorious deeds

Making use of one’s wealth without greed and longing, possess of the insight that sustains spiritual freedom

These Buddhist principles provided the ground for some 21st century authors to define the concept of Buddhist economics 3. But Buddha himself made it very clear: real happiness does not come from acquiring or consuming material things. Happiness is essentially a state of mind or consciousness, and mind/consciousness is distinct from matter. Thus, Buddhism considers the path of mental or spiritual development superior to that of material development. What really matters is to psychologically detach oneself from matter, and strive for liberation and enlightenment, which is considered the ultimate state of happiness and fulfillment. This is achieved by the cultivation of values within one’s mind, such as insight, compassion, tolerance and detachment. Only this will bring true happiness, both for the individual and society4.

Economics

Economics has its roots in ancient Greece (the term is derived from ‘oikonomikos’, literally meaning ‘Household Management’), and now is commonly defined as ‘a science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which alternative uses’5. In this discussion, it is important to note that economics defines ends and means primarily in material terms, which moreover can be quantified in monetary terms. Immaterial and non monetary values are considered subjective and therefore outside its scope 6. Further, by stating that economic means are naturally limited and scarce, economic theory accepts a natural element of competition for these resources.

Economic textbooks talk of economic laws assuming man naturally competes for scarce and limited material resources. Happy is the man who is able to consume these resources, unhappy is the one who is not. Classical economics tell us that it makes no sense to exert time, effort or expense on maintaining values, if money can be made by ignoring them. Intangibles don't count.

One of the great economists of our time, Lord Keynes, wrote in 1930 that the time that everybody would be rich was not yet there: "For at least another hundred years we must pretend to ourselves and everyone else that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is useful and fair is not. Avarice and usury and precaution must be our gods for a little longer still. For only they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight"7. In Keynesian thought, which had a large effect on economists for much of the last century, ethical considerations are not merely irrelevant, and they are an actual hindrance.

The assumptions underlying the so-called "economic laws" were developed at a time when religion was being separated from science, the accepted worldview became secularized, and the sacred was substituted by belief in matter. Economic theory was affected by great scientific discoveries in physics, biology and psychology, and economic laws were presented with the same authority as laws of nature. Newton and Descartes described reality in terms of a more or less fixed number of “building blocks”, of “things”, subject to measurable laws such as gravity and, put together smartly, operating like a big machine. The world of matter was regarded as a mere machine, to be used by man, his reason and free will.

Darwin had described human beings as a relatively intelligent species evolved from primitive apes motivated by lusts and aggression (as Freud would confirm later in psychology). Our intelligence has taught us to behave socially, but fundamentally we are selfish beings subject to the law of "survival of the fittest". When Adam Smith, in his famous work The Wealth of Nations, introduced the "invisible hand" of the market, by which the things and building blocks can be exchanged efficiently on the basis of each individual's self interest, we extended these laws into the realm of economics. 19th century economists such as Malthus and Ricardo, added the notion that economies are closed systems, bound by fixed quantities of material goods. No matter how large economies become, they remain closed, thus limited. This has led to an important premise underlying classical economics: scarcity is a natural state. Hence it is believed that competition for scarce resources, or even war, is natural too. We forgot that Adam Smith wrote in his earlier work The Theory of Moral Sentiments that markets could not function without ethics and morals. We have come to believe that greed and selfishness is what economies are all about.

Economist E.F. Schumacher observed in his landmark book "Small is Beautiful" that the idea of competition, natural selection and the survival of the fittest, which purports to explain the natural and automatic process of evolution and development, still dominates the minds of educated people today. Schumacher argues that

These ideas, combined with the belief in positivism, have wrongly been given universal validity. They simply do not stand up to factual verification. But since they conveniently relieved us from responsibility - we could blame our immoral behavior on "instincts" - these ideas have retained a prominent place in the consciousness of modern man8.

In fact, over the last two centuries we have firmly enshrined these principles in our capitalist legal systems, domestically and internationally. For example, the international laws governing the main multilateral agency for international trade, the World Trade Organization (WTO), are based on Ricardo's concept of "comparative advantage", the idea that nations, by specializing yet keeping our borders open, will benefit from unfettered competition. This arose from 17th century Europe which had invented the nation state to better deal with the opportunities provided by colonialist expansion.

Likewise, with the emergence of the nation state, monetary systems and policies were developed based on the notion of scarce money supply, linked to gold and silver, the value of which was controlled by the nation. The artificial measurement of money scarcity, when the churches relaxed their restrictions on interest bearing lending (considered ‘usury’ for many centuries)9, introduced an official element of competition among those in need of funding10. In contrast, those with money could set rules on how the scarce resources should be invested. These rules, now enshrined in corporate and banking law (and forming the basis of what we know as ‘capitalism’), favor those with wealth over those who have not. These ‘have nots’, the vast majority, have been locked in a competitive cycle for scarce capital ever since. When a competitor achieves a monopoly, he is punished under anti-trust laws, for competition must go on. The judge in the antitrust case against Microsoft ruled that the firm's monopoly had done "violence to the competitive process"11. In our modern society we take it for granted, and in fact consider it healthy, that competition has become a structural feature of our societies.

What do We Measure?

At the same time we have developed indicators to measure the wellbeing of our society in terms of economic growth. Inspired by the mathematical approach of the natural sciences, we have chosen indicators which measure things that can be quantified by assigning monetary weightings. Thus, they exclude qualitative distinctions. Yet over the last decades it has appeared that it are exactly the qualitative factors that are crucial to our understanding the ecological, social and psychological dimensions of economic activity. For example, economic calculations ignore the value of things such as fresh water, green forests, clean air, traditional ways of life, to name but a few – simply because they cannot be easily quantified. This partial blindness of our current economic system is increasingly recognized as the most important force behind the accelerating destruction of the global environment.

The most basic measure of a nation’s economic performance, is called Gross National Product (GNP) calculated as on the basis of all quantifiable economic transactions recorded in a given period. Governments want to see this grow each year. Yet GNP statistics are inherently flawed. In calculating GNP, natural resources are not depreciated as they are being exploited. Buildings and factories are depreciated, as well as machinery, equipment, trucks and cars. Why are forests not depreciated after irresponsible logging and farming methods turn them into barren slopes causing erosion and landslides? The money received from the sale of logs is counted as part of the country’s income for the year. Further, the national statistics would show that the country has gone richer for cleaning up landslides. The funds spent on the chain-saws and logging trucks will be entered on the expense side of the project’s accounts, but those to be spent on the supposed replanting will not. Nowhere in the calculations of this countries GNP will be an entry reflecting the distressing reality that millions of trees are gone forever.

Aside from the environment, traditional GNP calculations ignore the informal, unpaid economy of caring, sharing, nurturing of the young, volunteering and mutual aid. This informal “Compassionate Economy” is hidden from economist’s statistics and therefore public view, yet it represents some fifty percent of all productive work and exchange in all societies.12 In developing countries, these traditional non-money sectors often predominate. Indeed, the United Nations Human Development Report in 1995 estimated such voluntary work and cooperative exchange at $16 trillion, which is simply missing from the world’s GNP statistics.

Classical economics holds that all participants in the market between supply and demand have ‘perfect information’ about the facts on which they base their choices. This is another assumption that has proven to be incorrect, especially in light of the buyer’s inability to ascertain to what extent a product has depleted natural resources or exploited labor. Our current economic system not only makes unrealistic assumptions about the information available to real people in the real world; it also assumes incorrectly that natural resources are limitless ‘free good’ failing to distinguish between renewable and non renewable goods and simply equating them on the basis of monetary values set by a supposedly ‘informed’ market.

Our system also fails to account for all the associated costs of what is called consumption. Every time we consume something, some sort of waste is created, but these costs are usually overlooked and externalized. For instance, for all the fuel we consume in a given day, we do not account for extra CO2 emission in the atmosphere. Since we equate an increase in consumption with an increase in ‘standard of living’, we encourage ourselves to produce more and more, and also more waste. This has led to the disturbing reality that those countries which are considered richest, produce the most waste.

Discounting the Future

Our national accounting standards also contain questionable assumptions about what is valuable in the future as opposed to the present. In particular, the standard discount rate that assesses cash-flows resulting from the use or development of natural resources assumes that all resources belong totally to the present generation. As a result, any value that they may have to future generations is heavily discounted when compared to the value of using them up now. Likewise, by discounting the future value of money on the basis of interest rates, we have accepted that a dollar spent today is more valuable than a dollar spent tomorrow. This has not only caused a dangerous short-term mentality among fund managers who control increasing amounts of investment funds which can be moved from one country to another at the speed of online digital communication. It also provided a whirlpool-like force behind the expansion of our financial markets, which have come to grow to such an extent that national authorities can no longer control them.

The financial markets, in particular, with the daily turnover of more than US$ 1.5 trillion on foreign currency markets worldwide, are now setting the pace for continued growth and expansion. Money should be moved in order to make more money. Short term rewards are more important than long term, sustainable investments. An increase in stock prices are equated with economic success, and conversely, a drop is regarded as an economic failure with immediate divestment as a result. This has had already disastrous results, as is shown by the repeated crashes of emerging markets, the internet bubble and recent corporate scandals such as Enron. Many have blamed this entirely on weak and ineffective governance, while only few recognize that the global system itself is at fault. It should, of course, be quite obvious that preoccupation with growth in a finite environment leads to disaster, but the supertanker of short term capitalism seems unstoppable.

By concentrating on the mere statistics of monetary indicators, we fail to distinguish between the qualitative aspects of growth; healthy or unhealthy growth, temporary or sustainable growth. We do not question what growth is actually needed, what is required to actually improve the quality of our life.

Recognizing this dilemma, and out of concern for the rapid depletion of natural resources caused by economic development, the concept of ‘sustainable development’ has emerged. The 1987 report by the World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, spread and popularized the term ‘sustainable development’, which it defined as “development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”13. This concept became a focus of national attention after the UN conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, 1992. Rio’s Agenda 21 commits all 178 signatory countries to expand their national statistical accounts by including both environmental factors and unpaid work14.

However, more than a decade later, only very few of these countries have been able to live up to their commitments. National Agenda 21 efforts have led to academic debates, heightened public awareness and minor adjustments in the SNA and taxation rules, but it has not fundamentally altered the way we manage and measure our national economy. National political agenda’s continue to be determined by interest groups dominated by commerce and industry who are locked on old paradigms, while in the meantime the power of national authorities and national democratic institutions have been gradually eroded by the globalization of industry, finance, technology and information.

Faith in the Market

Ironically, coinciding with the emergence of the sustainable development movement, mainstream political and economic leadership has embraced free market capitalism as a golden formula. Particularly since the 1980-ies, with the demise of socialism and the promising allure of globalization, we have come to see the competitive market process as sacred. The bodies that rule our global economy today, the G7 (the world’s industrialized countries), IMF and the World Bank (together known as the ‘Washington consensus’) prescribe the world a neoclassical recipe of privatization, decentralization and market reform, assuming that our common interests are best served by the invisible hand of the market.

Critics of this faith are generally silenced by powerful arguments. They are told that government interference in markets will only lead to inefficient wasteful government bureaucracies. They claim that history has shown that the libertarian or laissez faire approach will allow markets to increase wealth, promote innovation and optimize production - and to regulate itself flawlessly at the same time. The fact that humans persist in behaving "irrationally and uneconomically" according to the market model, far from invalidates the model, they say; we simply have not yet learned to appreciate the benefits of competition. Some economists, trying to account for "irrational" religious commitments, such as voluntary gifts or abstention from consumption, even introduced a new economic factor - "afterlife consumption"15.

As Robert Kuttner points out in "Everything for Sale":

Trust in the unfettered market place, enshrined in politics by Ronald Reagan's 1980 victory and by the clarion call for less government interference in people's lives, is undiminished to this day. Dissenting voices have been drowned out by a stream of circular arguments and complex mathematical models that ignore the real-world conditions and disregard values and pursuits that can't easily be turned into commodities. These values and pursuits happen to be ones that most of us consider integral to our identity: justice, freedom, worship, leisure, family, charity and love.16

Yet it is increasingly clear that our economies are inherently flawed. While substantial wealth is generated mostly by a minority elite in developed countries, the majority of the world population remains poor. The gap between rich and poor keeps growing in all societies, and also among countries in the world. Environmental degradation seems irreversible. Drugs and new forms of slave trade prosper. Corruption and corporate fraud is widespread. Stock markets are turning into global casinos. War is increasingly 'economic', motivated by either the lack or the protection of wealth. Even if the global economy prospers, it seems to prosper at the expense of the air, earth, water, our health and our rights to employment. So we have to revisit the assumptions that underlie all this. Are the economic laws really uncontrollable? Spiritual teachings tell us that we make up reality, so likewise it must be us who make up the economy. For better or for worse, economies and business don't function separately from our decisions, since without us they wouldn't exist.

So if we want a better economy we have to look deeply at who we are and how we live.

Spiritual Views Rediscovered

Buddhism and in fact all spiritual traditions have long described reality in rather different terms than traditional economic theory. While the latter are primarily concerned with a fragment of human behavior, namely "economic" actions defined as those which can be quantified in terms of money, the former approach reality holistically, incorporating all actions - and even thoughts - that make up our being and society. While Newton, Descartes and classical economics define the world in things, of separate building blocks, spiritual teachings point out there is really no independent thing there, and that the focus on things will miss the relations and the whole context that make the thing possible. In economic textbooks human beings are isolated consumers and producers interacting at markets driven by monetary gains. In spiritual traditions humans are viewed as being part of a larger whole with which they can communicate by opening up their hearts and minds.

This holistic viewpoint is lent credence by modern physics, which postulate that the universe consists of unified patterns of energy. According to one of Einstein's favorite epigrams, the field generates the object, not vice verse. That is, whole systems give rise to specific things, not the other way around. While in the Cartesian worldview we can only know reality by knowing specific parts, Einstein discovered that in order to know things, we need to know the whole from which they originate. In other words, we are not isolated hard and fast physical things but more like “light beings” or “energy-flows” continuously interrelating and changing. Thus, we are more like “intangibles” - exactly that which cannot be measured in classic economic models.

The new understanding of reality is a systemic understanding, which means that it is based not only on the analysis of material structures, but also on the analysis of patterns of relationships among these structures and of the specific processes underlying their formation. This is evident not only in modern physics, but also in biology, psychology and social sciences. The understanding of modern biology is that the process of life essentially is the spontaneous and self-organizing emergence of new order, which is the basis of life's inherent abundance and creativity. Moreover, the life processes are associated with the cognitive dimension of life, and the emergence of new order includes the emergence of language and consciousness.

Most economic strategies are built around the possession of material things such as land, labor and capital. What counts is how much real estate we own, how much money we have and how many hours we work. The ideal for many people is to own enough land and capital, so we don't have to sell our time. This strategy, which no doubt will be recognized by many of us in developed countries, is based on the assumption that land, labor and capital is all there is, that the real world is a closed end system. Spiritual traditions and modern sciences claim the opposite. They recognize the unlimited potential in every sentient being - the potential to be whole and enlightened. Our minds create and pervade everything, hence physical reality is open for the spiritual.

The concept of scarcity has also been refuted by modern discoveries. Nuclear energy is based on breaking the seemingly closed-end system of the atom and the universe has been found to continuously expand. Like the expanding limits of outer space, the modern business of cyber space and Internet, has created unexpected opportunities and amounts of new wealth. Another example, while being rightfully concerned about the limited availability of the planet's fossil fuel deposits, there is no shortage of energy in our solar system. In fact, we are surrounded by abundant energy sources: sun and wind, as well as the earth's heat, motion and magnetism. But most renewable energy resources are not available to us, not because they don't exits, but because we don't have the know how to tap them.

The key in the modern knowledge economy is that what counts here is not merely material possession, but know how and creativity, the domain of the mind17. As many of the new e-commerce companies have found out, a company cannot "own" the knowledge that resides in the heads of the employees. Research has shown that most successful business strategies focus less on things but more on how to manage them. It is commonly accepted that all technical and social innovation is based on what is now phrased as 'intellectual capital'. And unlike ordinary capital, intellectual capital is not subject to physical limits.

So what does all this tell us? Clearly, the 19th century mechanistic ‘matter only’ worldview has been turned on its head. And thus we should revise long held axioms. First, the traditional concept that we are simply competitive beings chasing scarce material resources is incorrect. Second, intangible values are equally important for our well-being. These intangibles are stored in the mind, free from physical constraints and therefore potentially of unlimited supply. Third, happiness is not merely determined by what we have, how much we consume, but also by what we know, how we can manage and how we can be creative, ultimately by who we are - so not by having, but by being. We are human beings after all. How do measure this reality?

How do we account for ‘self generation’, ‘spontaneity’ and ‘consciousness’ in our economic worldview? Deterministic logic is no longer sufficient. New ways of measuring are required to embrace this new reality.

Human Nature and Motivation

Before we can move there, let us first examine this ‘being’ side of our existence. What kind of beings are we? Happy or unhappy? Altruistic or selfish? Compassionate or competitive? Modest or greedy? Driven to seek short term pleasure, or seeking meaning, a higher purpose, a longer term state of happiness? These are important questions on which economic theory and spiritual traditions hold different views. Economists have accepted the principles of selfish individualism: the more the individual consumes, the better off he will be. And he consumes out of perpetual needs, which – if unmet – make him innately unhappy. Economic growth is achieved when individuals consume more and more so that demand and output are boosted. This leaves no room for altruism, where an individual may incur costs for no conceivable benefit to himself. This approach reduces the meaning of cooperation to a mere reciprocal arrangement among individuals: individual sacrifices on behalf of the community can only be seen as an insurance policy, for it will ensure the individual that the community will help him in the future.

We can understand the need for values such as compassion because of mutual dependence in this increasingly smaller and interconnected world. But spiritual traditions point to another, more profound and personal dimension of compassion. They advise us to make altruism the core of our practice, not only because it is the cheapest and most effective insurance policy for our future, but specifically because the real benefit of compassion is that it will bring about a transformation in the mind of the practitioner. It will make us happy.

How can this be done if our real nature is selfish? Compassion can only work if our nature is receptive to having an altruistic attitude, if somehow compassion is in harmony with our essence, so that we can actually enjoy being compassionate. If we are inherently selfish, any attempt to develop a compassionate attitude would be self defeating.

Most religions state that mankind's nature is good. As we might say, our kind is kind. Buddhism explains that there is no real independently existing self that is either good or bad. Our selfish motives are based on an illusionary belief in an independent self, separating ourselves from others. We do have selfish traits, they may even dominate us, but they can be removed by practice. And since we are so connected to the world, since there is no disconnected self, the practice of compassion is most effective.

Several modern scientific disciplines, such as biology, psychology and medical science, have started to study the effects of empathy on the human mind, body, health and relationships. Not surprisingly, they have ascertained that compassion is of tremendous help to our well-being. A compassionate frame of mind has a positive effect on our mental and physical health, as well as on our social life, while the lack of empathy has been found to cause or aggravate serious social, psychological and even physical disorders18. Recent research on stress shows that people who only seek short term pleasure, are more prone to stress than those who seek a higher purpose, who seek meaning rather than pleasure.19 Meaning generally is derived from values such as serving others, going beyond short term selfish needs. The fact that disregarding short term selfish needs is actually a source of longer term happiness, turns the classical economic notion of selfish individualism upside down.20

As economist Stanislav Menchikov observes:

The standard, neoclassical model is actually in conflict with human nature. It does not reflect prevailing patterns of human behavior. [..] If you look around carefully, you will see that most people are not really maximizers, but instead what you might call ‘satisfyers’: they want to satisfy their needs, and that means being in equilibrium with oneself, with other people, with society and with nature. This is reflected in families, where people spent most of their time, and where relations are mostly based on altruism and compassion. So most of our lifetime we are actually altruists and compassionate 21.

What does all this mean for our economy? Here we are entering unchartered territory, as is always the case in a paradigm shift. But some things are clear. The debate is not simply on government versus markets. As noted earlier, I believe it is about deeper, spiritual issues. Economic thinking is primarily focussed on creating systems of arranging matter for optimal intake of consumption. It assumes that the main human impulses are competition and consumption, and it has sidestepped spiritual and moral issues because it would involve a qualitative judgment on values and other intangibles that go beyond its initial premises. But by assuming that the more we consume, the happier we are, economists have overlooked the intricate working of the human mind.

At the root of this belief in the market lies a very fundamental misconception. That is, we have not really understood what makes us happy. Blind faith in economics has led us to believe that the market will bring us all the things that we want. We cling to the notion that contentment is obtained by the senses, by sensual experiences derived from consuming material goods. This feeds an emotion of sensual desire. At the same time, we are led to believe that others are our competitors who are longing after the same, limited resources as we are. Hence we experience fear, the fear of losing out, the fear that our desire will not be satisfied.

So we can observe that the whole machine of expanding capitalism is fuelled by two very strong emotions: desire and fear. They are so strong that they appear to be permanent features of our condition. Yet Buddha taught that since these emotions are based on ignorance, a misconception of reality, they can be removed by the understanding of reality, which is the prime object of Buddhist practice. According to Buddhism, happiness is an inner experience, available to anyone, regardless of wealth or poverty. Further, fundamentally there is nothing that we lack. By developing the mind, our inner qualities, we can experience perfect wholeness and contentment. Finally, if we share with others, we will find that we are not surrounded by competitors. Others depend on us as we depend on them.

#### The aff embeds an individualistic notion of health into our environments—that’s mutually exclusive with enhancing relational attentiveness.

Hershock, 21—director of the Asian Studies Development Program at the East-West Center (Peter, “Total Attention Capture and Control: A Future to Avoid,” *Buddhism and Intelligent Technology: Toward a More Humane Future*, Chapter 4, 109-110, dml)

Structurally, what seems likely given current change trajectories is that much as music and videos have become automated streaming services responsive to one’s expressed tastes, day-to-day health provision will become a largely automated service in which scheduled doctor’s visits will be a thing of the past since one’s health status will be continually monitored, analyzed, and addressed. This gathering of medical intelligence and the algorithmic analysis of the resulting data might be welcomed by many, especially if linked to options for virtual doctor’s visits and automated prescription delivery. Subscribing to a streaming medical service might be preferable to low-cost health provider plans under which nonemergency physician consultations often need to be booked weeks—and in some cases months—in advance. It’s conceivable, as well, that using algorithmic explorations of big data and increasingly detailed quantifications of self will yield superior healthcare results, especially in the case of rare and so-called systemic diseases that are notoriously difficult to diagnose and treat. Healthcare technology might, in effect, become part of one’s overall environment—a kind of secondary immune system, identifying and responding to threats before one is even aware of being infected, ill, or at risk.

As intriguing as this possibility might be, it is important to note that the digitalization of healthcare services is, at present, likely to scale up the prevalent conception of health as individual freedom from disease and the maintenance of normal bodily and mental functions and of healthcare intervention as a process of identifying the proximal causes of functional or structural irregularities and pain and then eliminating these pharmaceutically, biomechanically, or surgically. Yet, medical science and public health studies strongly support recognizing that health is an expression of allostatic or adaptive readiness at the nexus of interdependencies among physiological, psychological, social, economic, cultural, political, and environmental dynamics. In other words, health is a multidimensional expression of intelligence in action. Healing does not simply consist in “a return to previous somatic norms but also meaningfully heightened awareness and increased relational capacity” (Hershock 2006:  48ff). Indeed, a Buddhist conception of health—consistent with the pursuit of kuśala outcomes—is that healing should result in our being stronger, more flexible, more resilient, more attentively astute, and more actively attuned to qualities of interdependence than we were before injury or illness.

It is not at all clear that smart health services could—or will ever—be oriented toward enhancing relational health. Consider, for example, the use of mindfulness apps to address stress and enhance subjective well-being. By letting users know that various vital signs are indicative of the onset of an episode of intensified stress, and guiding them through a short meditation exercise, apps like this can successfully lower blood pressure and restore baseline respiration. They will not necessarily help people to become better at identifying and responsively addressing the relational sources of stress. Indeed, by outsourcing attentiveness to subtle bodily registers of relational malaise to machine intelligence, apps like these might ironically compromise the adaptive capacities of their human users.

#### The alternative is Black Buddhist meditation -- in the face of a case about antitrust laws, we only offer silence.

**Vesely-Flad ’19** [Rima; May 13; Ph.D. Director of Peace and Justice Studies at Warren Wilson College; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 5,” p. 85-86]

Lovingkindness practices toward the self, alongside personal interpretations of the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Noble Path, guide many Black Buddhist practitioners who have suffered generational trauma and racist degradation in our contemporary moment. Valerie Mason-John, also known as Vimalasara, an African-Canadian teacher in the Nichiren tradition, speaks of the importance of the Four Noble Truths for people of African descent in particular. The First Noble Truth is that suffering is a universal experience. Mason-John states, “We of African descent know what suffering is. It’s in our DNA.”20 The Second Noble Truth states that suffering is a result of ignorant craving. For many Black Buddhists, the interpretations of the causes of suffering are greatly expanded into teachings of white myopia, the desire to exist in delusion, and the collective ego of the dominant white culture. The Third Noble Truth is that there is a path to end suffering. The very promise of liberation is enticing for people of African descent. The Fourth Noble Truth describes the path of liberation, known as the Noble Eightfold Path. In this path, “Right Concentration,” which leads to settling the mind, is a particularly compelling practice.

Manuel writes in The Way of Tenderness:

Only in the deep silence of meditation did I begin to disbelieve that I was born only to suffer. Eventually after many years of sitting meditation, I recognized the root of my self-hatred, both external and internal, as a personal and collective denial or denigration of the body I inhabited.

Her reflections are echoed by Owens’s reflections on silence: “silence became the medium in which I was reborn into a sense of happiness and contentment. But overall, it ushered me into a period of thriving and flourishing in my life.”22 In meditation, practitioners cultivate their ability to confront the suffering wrought by their mental constructs rather than avoid pain. They seek to heal the damage wrought by racism and to rearticulate profound teachings that are rooted in concentration practices. In-depth interviews with Black Buddhist teachers and practitioners illuminate a progression in the process of acknowledging one’s racial identity and embracing teachings of non-self. The progression begins with claiming and rearticulating Blackness as part of the social self, and in so doing, embracing African ancestry. For many, the next step is entering into an experience of silence that facilitates a recognition of the truth of non-self. Finally, Black Buddhist teachers and long-term practitioners integrate embodiment with the psychologically liberating practice of silence. The ten Black Buddhist teachers and long-term practitioners interviewed for this chapter emphasized four primary themes in their articulation of embodiment and Anatta: (1) Being visible in social spaces; (2) Claiming African ancestral lineages; (3) Embracing the two truths of relative and absolute existence; and (4) Liberating the self and the community.

#### Our mystical endeavor into Black Buddhism creates a spiritual home in an environment that perpetuates suffering while paradoxically trying to alleviate it -- that psychological liberation is a necessary prerequisite to achieve social liberation.

**Vesely-Flad ’19** [Rima; May 13; Ph.D. Director of Peace and Justice Studies at Warren Wilson College; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 5,” p. 94-96]

The suffering induced by racism compels Black Buddhists to interpret teachings on non-self in nuanced ways. Many practitioners spoke of the importance of bringing lived experience—including suffering due to racism—to the cushion. These practitioners spoke of the trauma endured by African ancestors and a need to honor the cultural heritages within African traditions, as well as to remember the agony of being dislocated from families, land, traditions, and languages. The Black Buddhist teachers and practitioners interviewed for this study are keenly aware that they stand on the shoulders of those who have paved a path to social and institutional access; they are also deeply in touch with the anguish that they themselves feel. Black Buddhist practitioners feel the weight of oppression in predominantly white sanghas as well as the larger social environment. They note that white practitioners will notice dark skin color without acknowledging their own discomfort and myopia. The hegemonic whiteness of American Buddhism can feel alienating and isolating; whiteness perpetuates suffering in an environment that is, paradoxically, actively focused on alleviating suffering. As Black people become liberated, it is critical that white practitioners who possess privileged bodies—within white hegemonic contexts that privilege them—be compelled to interrogate their assumptions, their social power, and their tendency to individualize suffering.

As white people “do their work,” it is important that Black people be visible and affirmed in predominantly white spaces: in sanghas, workplaces, and in a society that aggressively polices people of color. In addition to promoting the value of Blackness, it is important to promote queer identity: to embrace the intersection of race, gender, and sexuality. For many Black Buddhist teachers, finding a spiritual home in which queer identity is welcomed is as paramount as finding a sangha that grapples with race, racism, and privilege.

In short, promoting Blackness and queerness allows for a social ease in a broader culture that suffers from white myopia, microaggressions, and systemic injustices. The ability to be honest about the origins of suffering facilitates exhaling, taking off masks, and cultivating of authentic presence. Practitioners feel that they are showing up for their own lives, in their entirety; that they can embrace Black identity and also let it dissolve; and that race does not have to be the central facilitating aspect of their relationships with themselves. They can be whole people who possess dark skin, and at the same time, they do not have to focus entirely on their embodiment, even as skin color mediates their experience in predominantly white social spaces, including sanghas.

In being able to take off masks and establish an authentic presence, Black Buddhist practitioners see themselves as being able to embrace two truths: conventional and mystical; relative and absolute. They can be “in the world, but not of it.” They acknowledge the importance of embodiment, but in the practice of silence, can also transcend the messages and norms that are relied upon in the social world. This is often a progression: Black practitioners grapple with their social identity while sitting on the cushion. Over time, the mind settles and a state of non-thinking is accessible. As Black practitioners access a psychological state of emptiness, not thinking, they can eventually hold together two ways of being: a self in the social world, and a non-self in a state of impermanence and constant change.

The ability to reach this internal state is psychologically liberating. The Black Buddhists who participated in this study assert that psychological liberation is a precursor for social liberation: Black people must be able to acknowledge, transcend, and transform the degrading constructs of Blackness in order to achieve political freedom. Sitting with racially induced suffering is essential for seeing the depth of it, allowing these messages to loosen their grip on the mind, and deconstructing the damage that has been wrought. Meditation practice facilitates liberation.

We live among those who, in having nothing, have everything.

**Moten ’13** [Fred; 2013; Professor of Performance Studies at New York University; *Blackness and Nothingness: (Mysticism in the Flesh)*, “Just Friends,” p. 753-757]

In a tradition of Buddhist teaching that goes back to the opening of The Gateless Gate, a thirteenth-century gathering of ko¯ans (case studies that take the form of stories, dialogues and/or questions meant to induce in the initiate dual intensities of doubt and concentration), that drama emerges as a deconstructive and deconstructed question, as exemplified in conventional presentations and interpretation of “Jo¯shu¯’s Dog.” The ko¯an reads: “A monk asked [Zen master] Jo¯shu¯ in all earnestness, ‘Does a dog have Buddha nature or not?’ Jo¯shu¯ said, ‘Mu!’” (Yamada 2004: 11). Even when we take into account Steven Heine’s warnings (Heine 2012) regarding the legitimacy of traditional attributions and interpretations of the Mu Ko¯an—which require us to consider both that it was not Jo¯shu¯ who responded to the question or that Jo¯shu¯’s response was the opposite of mu and that, therefore, the negative way that response is understood to open ought now to be closed—we are left with an ontotheological possibility that blackness may well exhaust. There is an appositional response, which this phantom query cannot properly be said to have called, that persists in and as an echoepistemology of passage, a sociotheology of the aneschaton, the instrumental interruption of telos by the universal (drum) machine, Blackwell’s prompt out to the study of the last things, the study carried out by the things that are last, by the least of these, whose movement constitutes a critique of the general and necessary relation between politics and death, a critique of the critique of judgment, a deconstruction of the opposition of heaven and hell. Cherry brings the noise of the end of the world in the invention of the earth. Though eschatology is understood to be a department, as it were, of theology, it has been both displaced by an administrative desire for the teleological and appropriated by a retributive desire for a kind of finality of and in sentencing, each in its commitment to sovereignty and the already existing structures that depend upon the very idea. But it’s not that I want to enclose things in the dialectical movement between beginning and end. Invention and passage denote an already existing alternative for which we are not constrained to wait. We are already down here on and under the ground, the water, as worked, unwrought nothingness working fleshly releasement in a privation of feasting, a fragility of healing. Mu is a practice of mysticism in the flesh; “Mutron,” the ritual Blackwell and Cherry perform, is their concentration meditation. It indexes the specific and material history of the drowned and burned, the shipped and held, as the condition for the release not just of the prevailing worldview but of the very idea of worldview, of transcendental standpoint and Pure Land. Cherry and Blackwell are initiates, who in turn initiate us, in what it is to abide in the social materiality of no place, of Having No Place, as a place for study. This shows up as a radical displacement of binary logic, moving through negation, because the way of the hold is no via negativa. Rather, the hold is distressed circuitry, an impedance or impediment of current, a placement of the self’s or the settler’s or the sovereign’s dyadic currency in kenotic abandon. “Mutron” is a way out of no way given in and as the exhaustion of what it is to abide, where the first and the last are neither first nor last.

To remain in the hold is to remain in that set of practices of living together where antikinetic theorizing is both bracketed and mobilized by performative contemplation, as in the monastic sociality of Minton’s, where the hermetic absence of and from home is given in and as a playhouse, a funnyhouse, a madhouse. The club, our subcenobitic thing, our block chapel, is a hard row of constant improvisational contact, a dispossessive intimacy of rubbing, whose mystic rehearsal is against the rules or, more precisely, is apposed to rule, and is, therefore, a concrete social logic often (mis)understood as nothing but foolishness, which is, on the other hand, exactly and absolutely what it is. Foucault’s meditations point precisely in this direction:

The ship of fools was heavily loaded with meaning, and clearly carried a great social force. . . . The madman on his crazy boat sets sail for the other world, and it is from the other world that he comes when he disembarks. This enforced navigation is both rigorous division and absolute Passage, serving to underline in real and imaginary terms the liminal situation of the mad in medieval society. It was a highly symbolic role, made clear by the mental geography involved, where the madman was confined at the gates of the cities. His exclusion was his confinement, and if he had no prison other than the threshold itself he was still detained at this place of passage. . . .

A prisoner in the midst of the ultimate freedom, . . . he is the Passenger par excellence, the prisoner of the passage. It is not known where he will land, and when he lands, he knows not whence he came. His truth and his home are the barren wasteland between two lands that can never be his own. . . . The link between water and madness is deeply rooted in the dream of the Western man. (Foucault 2006: 10–11)

Deleuze has seized on this dimension of Foucault’s thought to probe how for him “the inside [functions] as an operation of the outside.” Indeed, “in all his work Foucault seems haunted by this theme of an inside which is merely the fold of the outside, as if the ship were a folding of the sea. . . . Thought has no other being than this madman himself. As Blanchot says of Foucault: ‘He encloses the outside, that is, constitutes it in an interiority of expectation or exception’” (Deleuze 1988: 81). Deleuze continues:

Forces always come from the outside, from an outside that is farther away than any form of exteriority. So there are not only particular features taken up by the relations between forces, but particular features of resistance that are apt to modify and overturn these relations and to change the unstable diagram. . . . [This is] “where one can live and in fact where Life exists par excellence.” . . . [This is] life within the folds. This is the central chamber, which one need no longer fear is empty since one fills it with oneself. Here one becomes a master of one’s speed and, relatively speaking, a master of one’s molecules and particular features, in this zone of subjectivation: the boat as interior of the exterior. (Deleuze 1988: 100–101)

Passage, which is to say this passage, which is to say the passage between these passages of Foucault and Deleuze, the passage between these and those of Wilderson and Mackey, is given in the hold that Cherry and Blackwell deconstructively reconstruct just so you’ll know that the music and its performance was never about transcendence unless transcendence is understood as immanence’s fugitive impurity. How would you recognize the antiphonal accompaniment to gratuitous violence—the sound that can be heard as if in response to that violence, the sound that must be heard as that to which such violence responds? Wilderson asks the question again so that it can be unasked; so that we can hear Cherry and Blackwell unask it in and as intimacy in dislocation. Unasking takes the form of a caesura, an arrhythmia of the iron system, that Blackwell presses into the interruptive, already interrupted New Orleans continuum of his roll whose distended rearticulation stretches out so you can go down in it enough to think about what it means somewhere you’re only supposed to be going through, to be contained in the atopic atemporality that propels you, as the immanence of the transcendental hallway of our endless preparation, our experimental trial, given as our ongoing study of how to speak, the terrible beauty of our imprisonment in the passage, our life in the folds. Blackwell asks a question that Cherry anticipates, but by which Cherry is driven and to which Cherry responds in the bent, appositional reflection that unasks it. This drama is revived in Wilderson’s questioning; the question is a seizure that moves us to unask it. That unasking is mu not because the question’s terms and assumptions are incorrect; not because the implied opposition of nothing and something—where nothingness is too simply understood to veil (as if it were some epidermal livery) (some higher) being and is therefore relative as opposed to absolute—doesn’t signify; but because nothing (this paraontological interplay of blackness and nothingness, this aesthetic sociality) remains to be explored; because we don’t know what we mean by it even when we recite or record its multiphonic swerve; because blackness is not a category for ontology or for phenomenological analysis. Wilderson’s question—“Would nothing ever be with nothing again”—precisely in its irreducible necessity, cannot be answered but can only be unasked in the lyricism of that ill logic that black monks incessantly, thelonially, perform, as difference without opposition, in “a black hole,” as Jay Wright says (Wright 2013: 56), “germ and terminal, expansive/in its nothingness.

What would it be for this drama to be understood in its own terms, from its own standpoint, on its own ground? This is not simply a question of perspective awaiting its unasking, since what we speak of is this radical being beside itself of blackness, its appositionality. The standpoint, the home territory, chez lui—Charles Lam Markmann’s insightful mistranslation of Fanon illuminates something that Richard Philcox obscures by way of correction, Among one’s own, signifies a relationality that displaces the already displaced impossibility of home and the modes of relationality that home is supposed to afford (Fanon 1967). Can this sharing of a life in homelessness, this interplay of the refusal of what has been refused and consent, this undercommon appositionality, be a place from which to know, a place out of which emerges neither self-consciousness nor knowledge of the other but an improvisation that proceeds from somewhere on the other side of an unasked question? But not simply to be among one’s own; rather, also, to live among one’s own in dispossession, to live among the ones who cannot own, the ones who have nothing and who, in having nothing, have everything. To live, in other words, within the general commonness and openness of a life in Deleuze’s sense (hence the necessity of a philosophy of life; hence the necessity but also the rigor of a disbelief in social death, where social death is precisely understood as the imposition of the subject’s necessity rather than the refusal of the subject’s possibility, which, in any case, the imposition founds and enforces. At stake is the curve, the suppleness and subtlety, not only of contemplation on social life but of contemplative social life; at stake is the force of an extraphenomenological poetics of social life. And so we arrive, again and again, at a profound impulse in Fanon that—as Chandler indicates in his reading, which is the initial reading, of Du Bois—constitutes Du Bois’s horizon and which appears in the various forms of that question whose necessity is so fundamental that it must be unasked—the question of the meaning of (black) being, the question of the meaning of (black) things. We study in the sound of an unasked question. Our study is the sound of an unasked question. We study the sound of an unasked question. In the absence of the amenity (some pleasantness or pleasantry of welcome or material comfort), what is borne in the emptiness or nothingness of the amenity (of which love or soul is born, in exhaustion, as a society of friends), what are the other elements of mu? Chant and ko¯an and moan and Sprechgesang, and babble and gobbledygook, le petit nègre, the little nigger, pidgin, baby talk, bird talk, Bird’s talk, bard talk, bar talk, our locomotive bar walk and black chant, our pallet cries and shipped whispers, our black notes and black cant, the tenor’s irruptive habitation of the vehicle, the monastic preparation of a more than three-dimensional transcript, an imaginal manuscript we touch upon the walls and one another, so we can enter into the hold we’re in, where there is no way we were or are.

### 1NC - Case

#### The politics of “care”, whether institutional or individual, are coopted by the state not to reduce harm, but increase it---their moral calls for helping others only mask the articulation of blackness as a threat to the smooth functioning of a white supremacist government

Sharron, 19 - Kelly Christina Sharron, Doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Arizona, 2019(“THE CARING STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONTRADICTION IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI,” Proquest Dissertations Library, bam)

Introduction: The Politics of Care: Feminism, Feminist Theory, and the State

This dissertation emerged out of an ongoing interest in state power, particularly as it relates to the carceral state. The conversation and events that overwhelmed these topics, for me, have been police violence. The shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, by white officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri became a national story, and framed what would become ongoing attention to police brutality. Moreover, the degree to which the police force and National Guard responded with military equipment, weapons, tanks, and riot gear sparked debate about what role police forces play in communities, if they have overstepped their authority, and the legitimacy of protest. While these are all important and worthy contributions, what seemed more troubling was the way that people readily accepted the solutions offered by the state. These solutions, and the rhetoric surrounding them, are what I have framed as “care.” They included things like community policing, accountability, and soft reforms like body cameras. As more unarmed people of color were killed by the police, it became immediately clear that the solutions offered were not enough to upend the problem, policing itself.

One of the most popular images to circulate after the Ferguson grand jury decision is one of a young black boy in an embrace with a white cop during a protest taking place in Portland, Oregon. This photo was shared over 400,000 times on Facebook, and marked a desire for reconciliation without meaningful change. The police officer appears to be comforting the boy, who is sobbing; it marks a tender moment between two differently affected groups, as though this could have been Wilson and Brown under different circumstances, if only they would have exhibited more care. In telling the story behind the photo, the pictured police Sgt. Bret Barnum approached the boy, Devonte Hart, who was holding a “free hugs” sign, “not as a police officer but just as a human being” (Grinberg 2014). Barnum continued, “it really solidified what all of us do this work for – this job for – to create good will” (Grinberg 2014). This isn’t the only “feel good” photo to circulate, there were other hugs, high fives, sharing food, etc. that all indicated this sense of peace and racial harmony. This sentimental moment between officer and person of color demonstrates a will and desire to care. These moments of sentimentality, as embodied in the state, are at the center of this dissertation. They foster the feeling that policing could be about good will, and that the state doesn’t necessarily intend to commit harm.

It is not just that the caring solutions and rhetoric offered by the state were ineffectual. These responses actually produce more harm. What on face appears to be contradictory aims and effects of state power, violence and care, are actually integral to each other. The reforms and sympathetic rhetoric offered by the state do not contribute to less policing, but rather extend policing. Rather than take on the serious critiques of policing, these reforms are offered as a way to harmoniously and surreptitiously continue and exacerbate the violent effects of policing. As it became clear in the years that followed, reforms failed to substantially affect police brutality, and in fact helped to short circuit some of the critiques about policing, all the while making the state appear kinder and gentler.

This dissertation investigates this range of political effects, from the violence and militarization to the use and popularization of care as a technique of re-legitimization and extension of state power. Brown’s death was not the first killing of an unarmed black person by a white officer to rise to public attention, but it did garner a particular resonance among activists, political officials, and the media. This dissertation takes stake in two particular moments: the death of Brown and the grand jury’s decision to not indict Wilson. These moments sparked larger questions about the function of the criminal justice system and who is afforded legal protections. The criticism of the grand jury decision and Ferguson policing practices culminated in a Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation that found racial injustices and disproportionately distributed revenueraising practices. In looking to care as a state technique, this dissertation examines media, state, and activist discourses surrounding the death of Brown, as well as the historical and political context of St. Louis. Using a cultural studies framework, I examine these discourses and archives asking: What are the particularities of Ferguson that catalyzed such a response? What is the context in which racist policing practices emerge? How does the political system admit injustice while also maintaining the fiction of colorblind democracy? This dissertation reveals the nuances and contradictions of state practice with respect to history, space, militarization, and justice. Finally, I consider the practices of social movements and the possibilities of incorporating care into more revolutionary frameworks amidst state-based care.

I situate my discussion of the shooting of Michael Brown in four fields of study: feminist theory, state theory, cultural studies, and political geography. I deploy feminist theory to understand how difference is made meaningful and contributes to disparate life outcomes; state theory to contextualize this iteration of statecraft with regard to care and violence; cultural studies to read and interpret language, discourse, and texts that are made meaningful through power; and political geography to discuss the impact of processes of spatialization and differentiation on policing practices. As I argue, in the contemporary U.S. landscape, state power relies on violence alongside inclusion, sympathy, and recourse. While Brown was shot in an act of violence, and the Grand Jury resulted in a legal violence, the subsequent responses of the Attorney General, President Obama, and the Department of Justice illustrate the ways in which the violence of the state is reoriented into rhetoric of justice, sympathy, and impending equality. Both violence and the more insidious operations of power are necessary to the functions of the state.

Brown’s death has a continued resonance in the ongoing attention to police violence, yet it was not the first, last, or most extraordinary. While Ferguson lies at the heart of this dissertation, I explore the political, social, and cultural milieu in which Ferguson is situated and articulated. Amidst a background of ongoing police militarization, dominant frameworks seek to maintain that blackness, as a constellation of ideas projected on and embodied in particular people, is the threat to American peace and justice rather than the extra-/illegal actions of the police. This dissertation seeks not only to unravel this claim, and demonstrate the racist ideologies that guide police action under even its most benevolent forms, but also to demonstrate the racist, gendered, sexualized, and classed underpinnings of the most idyllic of terms and aspirations from the state, and the ways in which these contradictions are actually critical to its function. The events in Ferguson exceed the geographic and political stakes of the event itself. Ferguson is instructive to the larger context of police and state power. Brown’s death is not an isolated instance, and protest and social movements do not respond to Brown alone. Rather, Brown’s death points to the larger milieu of racist policing practices—past, present, and future—taking place in Ferguson and across the United States over generations. Stuart Hall et. al's Policing the Crisis (1978; 2013) provides a framework and model to think about the significance of a singular event (in their case, the Handsworth mugging) and its relationship to the social milieu. Of their method, they say: Our concern was to use such a starting point – concrete events, practices, relationships and cultures – to approach the 'structural configurations that cannot be reduced to the interactions and practices through which they express themselves'... we sought to emulate the ethnographic imagination but also to move beyond the focus on the here and now of everyday 'interactions and practices' by locating them in the histories taking place behind all our backs (Hall et al. 1978; 2013, xi).

The text shuttles between the historical context, the Handsworth mugging, the symbol of the mugger, the state, the media, and the structuring logics of law and order. I follow the method put forth in Policing the Crisis to describe the events in Ferguson, but also their larger histories, contexts, representations, and effects. I also describe the expressions of care and their contextualization amidst violent rhetoric and effects.

Care

Sara Ahmed opens The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2015) with a question: “How does a nation come to be imagines as having a ‘soft touch’? How does this ‘having’ become a form of ‘being’, or a national attribute?” (Ahmed 2015, 1). Deeply personal, and personalized, attributes like emotions, feelings, and orientations, take on a national form, and are narrated as traits of the nation. Taking Ahmed’s description of national emotions as a starting point, I explore these questions throughout: How are emotions imagined to be part of collective bodies and institutions? What are the implications of imagining care as an institutional activity or affective orientation? What does it mean to make the police care?

In The Care of the Self (1986) Michel Foucault talks about care as pertaining to the body and the soul, as a means to cultivate and perfect oneself. Foucault describes the evolution of care:

It took the form of an attitude, a mode of behavior; it became instilled in ways of living; it evolved into procedures, practices, and formulas that people reflected on, developed, perfected, and taught. It thus came to constitute a social practice, giving rise to relationships between individuals, to exchanges and communications, and at times even to institutions. And it gave rise, finally, to a certain mode of knowledge and to the elaboration of a science” (Foucault 1986, 45).

Foucault describes a shift in care from the self to more general realms like medicine, knowledge, and institutions. Care is an orientation toward the self, as well as to objects. Foucault provides the scaffolding to think of care as extending beyond the self, or relations between people, and to thinking about the state and police as institutions of care, or as institutions involved in caring relations. In other words, the state has the capacity to care, to invoke care, for its citizens.

The meaning of care includes many dimensions including care for the self, care for others, and institutionalized care. Care most often describes a relational, ethical orientation, which eschews individualism in favor of communitarian ethics (See Engster 2005; Thomas 1993). These discussions and various viewpoints on care are related to the central terms discussed by Ahmed and Foucault, namely the integration of care into institutions and the projection of care, feelings, and emotions onto national bodies. I briefly consider care and caring, particularly as they have been developed in feminist ethics and theory, as feminine, ethical, interdependent, blurring public and private spheres, and finally when oriented to the state. While the meaning of care and its implications are often debated and discussed, care is generally portrayed as a panacea to political problems with very little consideration of what some potential pitfalls of care, or how care could be mobilized in malevolent ways.

#### Reject their articulation of the status quo as an “untouched market”---parento articulates why choice in healthcare doesn’t exist---nothing about NPs changes the fundamental structure of healthcare---

#### Plan can’t possibly solve shortages even with full access

Kirch and Petelle 17 – Associated of American Medical Colleges

(Darrel and Kate, “Addressing the Physician ShortageThe Peril of Ignoring Demography,” May 2017, JAMA 17, 2017;317(19):1947-1948, doi:10.1001/jama.2017.2714)

Of the many challenges that US health care faces, demographic change is foremost among factors contributing to workforce shortages. Arguably, it is also the variable about which the facts are clearest. The population of the United States both is increasing in number and is aging. Current projections indicate that between 2015 and 2030, the US population will increase by 12% to 359 million, with the population aged 65 years or older projected to increase by 55%. With 10 000 individuals in the United States turning 65 years old every day, this older population will drive increased demand for health services over the next few decades. Not only is the population as a whole aging, but more than one-third of all currently active physicians will be aged 65 years or older within the next 10 years, and the retirement decisions of those physicians will have a significant effect on physician supply.1 Physician Workforce Projections Beyond demographic change, uncertainty about future policy regarding health insurance and the financing of care, the potential implications of integrated care delivery models, and new developments in technology complicate the picture of the future physician workforce. Considering all these factors, the annual physician workforce projections commissioned by the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) take a multivariable approach. The method analyzes a number of assumptions and determines variable outcomes to assess the nation’s current situation and future needs. The recently released 2017 update1 of annual physician workforce projections indicates that under likely scenarios, the United States will face a shortage of between 40 800 and 104 900 physicians by 2030. Workforce projections for surgical specialties are an area of particular concern, with a projected shortfall of between 19 800 and 29 000 surgical specialists by 2030. While some contend that repealing the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will help resolve the physician shortage, these projections indicate that if the ACA is replaced with policies and programs that reduce current coverage to pre-ACA levels, future demand would decrease by only 6000 to 10 000 physicians.1 Regardless of the future of the ACA, shortages in the numbers of physicians, especially in certain specialties, are likely to persist. The data also indicate shortages in both specialty and primary care and in both urban and rural communities. In fact, many individuals in US urban and rural underserved communities are already feeling the effects of the shortage—wait times for physician visits are long, and the most vulnerable people often have difficulty accessing a physician when they need one. Some suggest that simply correcting maldistribution—too many physicians in suburban areas, too few in certain urban and rural areas—will solve the issue. However, an analysis based on 2015 population data indicates that if underserved populations had full access to physicians and utilized health care at the same rate as the rest of the population, an additional 34 800 to 96 800 physicians would be required immediately to meet that demand.1 Thus, even if it were mandated, redistributing physicians would still result in shortages.

#### Plan overburdens nurses.

Seegart 16 – Medical Economics

(Liz, “What single-payer healthcare would mean to doctors,” 5-25-16, <http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-economics/news/what-single-payer-healthcare-would-mean-doctors?page=0,3>)

But administrative simplicity will come with a lot of tradeoffs, experts say. Downsides of single payer for physicians Since the government sets prices in a single-payer system, doctors are left with little choice but to accept those rates or not participate at all. Critics contend the government will also dictate what services and treatments are covered based on financial considerations rather than medical necessity. That could reignite the “death panel” debate, allegations made by Republicans during the crafting of the Affordable Care Act, which claimed incorrectly that an anonymous panel would determine whether some sick people would receive health care as a way to control costs.Physician compensation would almost certainly drop, according to Hussey. While an apples-to-apples comparison is difficult, he points out that in Canada, which has government-set payment rates, physicians earn less than their American counterparts. Over the long term, he wonders if this could change how medicine is practiced. “Would it make it harder to be a physician and get by financially?” he asks. Kominski predicts a significant backlash should the U.S. try to hold down costs by reducing payments to physicians and hospitals. It will be difficult to persuade the medical profession to agree that for the good of the country they should start accepting lower payments for their services. “If it were easy to achieve we would have done it by now,” he says. Michael D. Tanner, senior fellow at the libertarian-leaning Cato Institute, has argued that in nations with universal healthcare, “attempts to control costs through governmental fiat have led to problems with access to care, either delays in receiving care or outright rationing.” He advocates more competition among insurers and providers within a free market system to generate cost savings. He has warned previously that an unlimited single payer model could bankrupt the country. Political, not medical, decisions will drive healthcare should single payer come to pass, predicts Robert E. Moffit, PhD., senior fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation’s Center for Health Policy Studies. When unlimited demand collides with limited supply, “government officials will determine who, and under what circumstances, patients receive care,” he says. Basic economics dictates that the government cannot control demand, but it can control supply through a global budget or price controls on services. Under that scenario supply does not keep up with rising demand. At best, Moffit says, quality of care suffers. At worst, there will be unnecessary deaths. “And let’s not even get started on how it will further intrude on doctor-patient relationships,” he says. Moffit points to overcrowded hospitals, long waiting lists for simple procedures and poor quality of care under Britain’s National Health Service as examples of what can happen when healthcare becomes an unlimited entitlement. As for reduced paperwork, “CMS issues tens of thousands of pages of rules and edicts. The idea that physicians could escape paperwork is fantasy.” Increased demand, combined with reduced access will fuel more dissatisfaction among patients. That, in turn, could lead to more complaints and malpractice claims, Kominski says. He’s also concerned about the overall impact on patients’ health. Sanders’ plan in particular lacks detail about what will happen to value-based care or patient-centered care—models that CMS is promoting to improve outcomes and keep patients healthier. “I don’t want to see those advances thrown out the window because we have a single payer system and are basically saying you can go to any doctor or hospital you want,” Kominski says. The American Medical Association does not support single payer, but other organizations, including the American College of Physicians (ACP) and the American Medical Students’ Association, do. The American Academy of Family Physicians supports universal coverage but advocates a blend of fee-for-service, care coordination fees and a patient-centered medical home model.

## Block

### Kritik

#### 2- Repetition Compulsion -- the addendum of human suffering and “black lives are affected too” is the Slave State’s advertisement that pornotropes black flesh a fungible tool for its antiblack project -- that ritual reputation is inseparable from the episteme of slavery and ensures complacency -- turns case.

**Warren ’18** [Calvin; 2018; Associate African American Studies at Emory University; *Ontological Terror; Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation*, “THE INVENTION OF THE NEGRO AND THE NECESSITY OF BLACK BEING,” p. 45-48]

In this schematic, the body is a metaphor for instrumentality or abject use value. Spillers suggests that this body “is reduced to a thing, to being for the captor.” With the death of African existence (the flesh) an oppres- sive mode of existence is imposed on the Negro. This existence is unlike human being. The human being’s mode of existence is to be for itself, and this being for itself is the structure of care between Dasein and Being. Black ~~being~~ is invented, however, precisely to secure the human’s mode of existence. Reading Spillers’s metaphysical schema through Heidegger’s, we could suggest that the black body or this “thing, being for the captor,” is invented to serve as the premier tool or equipment for human being’s existential project (and I would argue that this equipment is not equivalent in form to the human, even if the structure of tool-being, as Graham Harman would call it, provides a general explanatory frame).37 In other words, the mode of existence for black being is what Heidegger would call “availableness.” Availableness is “the way of being of those entities which are defined by their use in the whole.”38 To exist as “a thing, being for the captor” is to inhabit a mode of existence dominated by internecine use and function. Black being, then, is invented not just to serve the needs of economic interest and cupidity, but also to fulfill the ontological needs of the human. This thing is something like Heidegger’s equipment—an object that when used with such regularity becomes almost invisible, or trans- parent, to the user (blackness is often unthought because the world uses it with such regularity; antiblackness is the systemization of both the use of blackness and the forgetting/concealment of black being). Utility eclipses the thing itself. We must, then, understand antiblackness as a global, 46 Chapter One systemic dealing with black bodies, as available equipment. Heidegger considers dealings the way the Being of entities, or equipment, is revealed phenomenologically through the use of this equipment. Antiblack dealings with black bodies do not expose the essential unfolding, or essence, of the equipment; rather, the purpose of antiblack dealings is to systemically obliterate the flesh, and to impose nothing onto that obliterated space—care and value are obsolete in this encounter.39 Therefore, equipment structure is predicated on the premier use of blacks within the network of equipment. In other words, black use cuts across every equip- mental assignment, making it the ultimate equipment. Why does black equipment cut across all assignments, and why is it the tool Dasein relies on to commence its existential journey? We might say the answer to these difficult questions is that the essence of black equipment is nothing— being is not there. If Heidegger assumes that equipment will reveal its being through its usage, then he did not anticipate the invention of the Negro— equipment in human form, embodied nothingness. Using black equipment reveals existence but not being (existence as non-being for Greek philosophers, according to Heidegger in Introduction to Metaphysics). This puzzle is what black philosophy must investigate, must think through, to understand the continuity of antiblackness.

Spillers describes black being is a “living laboratory,” and we can conceptualize this laboratory as the source of availableness for modernity. A living laboratory is a collection of instruments for carrying out ontological experimentation, or the construction of the human self. Black beings constitute this irresistible source of availableness for the world. Saidiya Hartman meditates on the ontological utility of black being for the human when she states:

The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave—that is, the joy made possible by virtue of the replaceability and interchangeability endemic to the commodity—and by the extensive capacities of property—that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, the fungability of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.

40 Instruments, tools, and equipment are interchangeable/replaceable; this is starkly different from human being, whose existential journey in the world renders it incalculable and unique. When I suggest that black being is pure function or utility, I mean precisely the way this being is used as a site of projection for the human’s desires, fantasies, and onto- logical narcissism. The body that Spillers presents is a necessary invention because it is through the human’s engagement with instruments (tools and equipment) that the human comes to understand the self. To be for the human is to serve as the empty vessel for the human’s reflection on the world and self. In short, what I am suggesting is that black being is invented as an instrument to serve the needs of the human’s ontological project. This use, or function, exceeds involuntary labor and economic interest. It is this particular antiblack use that philosophical discourse has neglected. The Negro, as invention, is the dirty secret of ontometaphysics.

If we follow Heidegger’s understanding of the human being as Dasein (being there) and thrown into the world, then black being emerges as a different entity: the Negro is precisely the permanence of not being there [Nicht Da Sein], an absence from ontology, an existence that is not just gone away (as if it has the potential to return to being there) but an exis- tence that is barred from ever arriving as an ontological entity, since it is stripped of the flesh.41 To assert that black being is not of the world is to suggest, then, that black being lives not just outside of itself, but outside of any structure of meaning that makes such existence valuable. Black being is situated in a spatiotemporality for which we lack a grammar to capture fully. Spillers’s body, then, is the symbolic and material signifi- cation of absence from Being. To be black and nothing is not to serve as an aperture of Being for the Negro; rather, it is to constitute something inassimilable and radically other, straddling nothing and infinity. The Negro is the execration of Being for the human; it is with the Negro that the terror of ontology, its emptiness, is projected and materialized. This is the Negro’s function.

Inventing the Negro is essential to an ontometaphysical order that wants to eradicate and obliterate such ontological terror (the terror of 48 Chapter One the nothing); and since ontometaphysics is obsessed with schematization and control, it needs the Negro to bear this unbearable burden, the execration of Being. To return to our proper metaphysical question “How is it going with black being?,” we can say that neither progressive legislation nor political movements have been able to transform black being into human being, from fleshless bodies to recognized ontologies. Spillers also seems to preempt the question when she states, “Even though the captive flesh/body has been ‘liberated,’ and no one need pretend that even the quotation marks do not matter . . . it is as if neither time nor history, nor historiography and its topics, show movement, as [the flesh] is ‘murdered’ over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, showing itself in endless disguise.”42 This onticide, the death of the flesh/African existence, continues impervious to legal, historical, and political change. This is to say that the problem of black being, as both a form of ontological terror for the human and a site of vicious strategies of obliteration, remains. To ask the (un)asked question “How is it going with black being?” is to inquire about the resolution of the problem of black and nothing, ontometaphysically, as it imposes itself onto the Negro. The answer to the Negro Question, then, is that the ritualistic and repetitive murder of the flesh, the primordial relation, is absolutely necessary and indispensable in an antiblack world. And as long as the world exists, this murder must continue.

#### 3- business as usual DA- 2AC framework arguments are an attempt to return to business as usual -- weighing the case and the K as a “middle ground” is a racialized politics of tolerance that can’t wait to change the channel and return to “real scholarship” MSU recognizes. Overcorrect your desire to go back to the “scheduled programming” that “we all expect”.

**Suh ’19** [Sharon; May 13; Professor of Buddhism at Seattle University; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 1,” p. 5-7]

“WE INTERRUPT YOUR REGULARLY SCHEDULED PROGRAMMING TO BRING YOU THIS VERY IMPORTANT PUBLIC SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENT . . .”: AKA BUSINESS AS USUAL IN THE ACADEMY

“We interrupt your regularly scheduled programming to bring you this very important public service announcement. . . .” Many of us grew up with this interruption, eyes glued to Saturday-morning cartoons, cereal bowl and spoon in hand. Or maybe it was the regular evening sitcom—an important announcement appears on the screen, the spectator watches with some concern, but maybe grows restless with the interruption of their televised fantasies, and then the programming we all expect and have invested in comes back on screen. I was reminded of these televised public service announcements while participating on a recent panel on power, privilege, and identity in American Buddhisms at the annual conference of the American Academy of Religion in 2017. The panel presenters included critical remarks on whiteness, class privilege, and sexual difference to a largely white audience of Buddhist Studies scholars who attended presumably to listen to some of the leading voices in Buddhism and difference. However, as the panel proceeded, it became readily apparent that the majority white audience was merely tolerating our scholarly interruptions (albeit with growing agitation) and that they could not wait to return to their regular programming of presentations analyzing Buddhist sutras or “real” scholarship. In other words, they wanted to change the channel on us and return to the disciplinary discussions they recognized— those that did not need to mention whiteness and that did not need to include much discussion of the simultaneity of identities that comprised much of the panel—Asian and Asian American Buddhist scholars, a queer white scholar from England, a white female scholar who studies whiteness and Buddhism, a black gay Buddhist lama, and myself—a second-generation Korean American cisgendered woman who studies Buddhism, gender, and race.

After the first few discussions of sexuality, the panel moved to the theme of race and that is when I began to sense in my bones that feathers were ruffled. Somehow, a presentation on sexuality was acceptable, but as soon as the term whiteness was uttered and whiteness in American Buddhism brought to the forefront, especially by an Asian American female body, there was a palpable shift in the room. I was not performing race in the ways the audience expected after all, for I began by troubling the whiteness in the room, the academy, and in sangha spaces. Our scholarly audience that was presumably here to listen to what we had to say about power and privilege began to fold arms over chests, shift in chairs, and the façade of exasperation and shut down ensued. They were not here for the purposes of genuine engagement and the egoless listening and epistemological humility that Charles Johnson offers as the foundations of Buddhism, but rather, out of a desire to gaze at difference with curiosity which soon turned into displeasure.13 They were there to witness the temporary disruption of their regular programming (an uncritical study of Buddhism steeped in Orientalist flavoring and racial superiority of whiteness and white normativity) and to show their support—tolerance—for diversity so they could return to their regular programming and business as usual.

In my own presentation, I spoke about the importance of acknowledging the hypervisibility and hyperinvisibility of people of color in American sanghas and studies of Buddhism in the West and how solid scholarship should engage in the requisite of interrogating power and privilege which induced sighs that seemed to complain “oh, this again?” I addressed the investments in whiteness that the field of Buddhist Studies has made and the costs of marginalization, racism, and minoritization of their knowledge meted out on people of color in the academy and in American sanghas. While their body language spoke volumes, their mouths remained silent. In the follow up question and answer, not one white scholar wanted to engage my explicit critique of Buddhism and whiteness. The experience was like a pin dropping—a silent but potential threat. As I gazed out at the audience, I could only see people of color with smiles on their faces; I got vigorous shakes of the head, thumbs up, and wide vocal applause. It was as if the only people in the room listening were the other people of color; white scholars neither challenged me nor expressed congratulations. In my hypervisibility I became invisible again. I was a flash on the screen giving a public announcement about whiteness and white supremacy and in an instant the channel returned to business as usual.

I am not sure why I was surprised by how the panel and presentation transpired; after all, it follows a formulaic storyline. This seems to be the way that spectatorship works with whiteness—a white gaze falls upon the spectacle of a person of color who has entered the guild, listens for evidence of their right to be part of the guild, notes the person’s failure to engage in “real scholarship,” and quickly returns to the gaze

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upon itself. It was in the question and answer period that I reached for my Buddhist killjoy survival kit and quickly devised an expedient mean to shift the dynamics of the panel itself, for several white male scholars of the audience began to pose exceptionally long questions about subjects not related to our panel and proceeded to answer the questions themselves. In so doing, they recentered whiteness as once again all eyes were on them; they attempted to reestablish that their words were the product of serious scholarship and that our time in public was up.

A seemingly endless debate about largely unrelated issues ensued as several white scholars in the audience began to pose critiques in the form of questions they themselves had the answers for and, in so doing, they shifted the attention of the room onto themselves. We, the actual panelists, were now sitting in the back of the room as the white male scholars suddenly recentered themselves and reestablished whiteness as the prevailing norm. I quickly decided in that moment that I no longer wished to be on air in this strange exhibition of power and privilege. I suddenly reached out for another Buddhist killjoy, one whose support I needed for my survival kit. I turned to the Buddhist lama, looked him in the eye and said, “I think we should have a moment together.” Shifting our gaze away from this curious spectacle of whiteness, our eyes locked and he said, “yes, let’s have a kumbayah moment” as he picked up my hands. Although the gesture was spontaneous, I reached out to the lama as another Buddhist killjoy, knowing that the gesture “is about the experience of having others who recognize the dynamics because they too have been there, in that place, that difficult place.”14 In so doing, we became the refuge and a gem to each other and created sanctuary in the midst of whiteness. I sought out safety and the only way that I knew how in that moment was to turn to my fellow Buddhist killjoy whose work on Buddhism, sexuality, and race I had deeply admired. I wanted to make a lateral dialogical move because I knew that the programming had just returned to “normal” so I shifted the landscape. Rather than become a silent voyeur to the new mini-panel that developed as a few audience members took over the space, I reached out to my co-panelist as a refuge and a lifeline that Ahmed describes as “a fragile rope, worn and tattered from the harshness of weather, but it is enough, just enough, to bear your weight, to pull you out, to help you survive a shattering experience.”15 It was a moment of co-bearing witness to whiteness.

#### Agony of Resilience DA -- Moten says even inspired permutations that emboldens resilient desires to transcend reality toward a tension-free world, no matter how revolutionary, establishes a notion of self that domesticates masters and dissonant and unwieldly which is violent on the level of form

Winters 16 (Joseph, Asst Prof of Religious Studies at Duke, HOPE DRAPED IN BLACK: Race, Melancholy, and Agony of Progress; Conclusion; p Google Books//shree)

In this book, I have argued that a hope draped in black, a hope made possible by melancholy,remembrance, and the contemplation of suffering and loss, is more promising than progress and its cognates for thinking about and reimagining black people’s diverse striving and the modern legacy of race more broadly. The language and logic of progress, even in its best and more inspiring permutations, resonates with, shapes, and emboldens desires for a harmonious, tension-free social world. These desires are all too human, understandable, and perhaps unavoidable. At the same time, attachments to progress and longings for a coherent, reconciled world, longing that mark race-taMlk as divisive or that betray an eagerness to move beyond race, diminish our capacity to remember and be affected by conflict, violence, death, and loss. Clinging to the proverbial symbol of America or a strong version of the postracial idea renders us less attuned to the ways these images both produce and justify everyday forms of anguish. A different set of possibilities, I have argued, open up when we think hope and melancholy together, when vulnerability to the suffering of others becomes a site for a different kind of future and imaginary. In order to sketch what this opaque possibility looks like, I have examined black literature, literary expressions of music, film, and critical theory. By examining these different domains, I have demonstrated how the work of sorrow, the breaks and cuts of literary jazz, the cuts, images, and sounds of film, and the fictional reimagination of race, gender, and national belonging can challenge, or at least expose, tendencies to forget, repress, displace, ,or explain away the tragic dimensions of race, sociality, and human coexistence. Certainly questions and concerns remain. For one, it might seem counterintuitive to trouble progressive narratives and longings at a time when hope, optimism, and resilience are needed in the face of wars, ecological disaster, economic crises, and so forth. In other words, people do not need to be reminded of the tragic quality of life. In the spirit of Richard Rorty, people need inspiring and encouraging stories, stories that remind us of historical achievements and moments when people intervened into and changed the state of things. While this is a valid concern, it is not necessarily incompatible with the themes and arguments put forth here. A commitment to change, even radical change, relies to some extent on reexamining the narratives, symbols, and imaginaries that keep us attached to the order of things. It requires selves to think about the relationship between micropractices and macroprocesses, between everyday habits, dispositions, sensibilities, and affective structures, on the one hand, and arrangements of power on the other. In other words, any radical intervention into the state of things entails changes and transformations in how selves remember, contemplate, experience the world, and see and hear suffering. Structural change must include practices, activities, and modes of being that cultivate heightened levels of vulnerability and attunement to the broken, dissonant features of lifeworld’s and social arrangements, to bodies, communities, struggles, and conditions that disconcert our sense of achievement, coherence, and complacency. Therefore, in response to Rorty’s important concerns, I content that receptivity, remembrance, being unsettled, troubling violent narratives and images of solidarity, and risking self-coherence and stability are occasions for and sources of inspiration, or a certain kind of inspiration. In line with this Rortyean concern, one might argue that melancholy, contemplation, and the deconstruction of narratives are merely critical dispositions and strategies that lack a constructive component. In other words, I have not offered a determinative vision or alternative to the state of things. The work of the negative, to be taken seriously, must ultimately generate something affirmative, substantive, practical, and well-defined. These kinds of qualms, usually directed at the so-called postructuralists, miss the fact that troubling, destabilizing, and undoing well-entrenched narratives and assumptions does do something; it does many things, in fact. It opens up spaces for contestation, tarrying, revision, and reimagination. Leaving the constructive moment indeterminate does not necessarily mean a retreat on practical matters or an unwillingness to imagine a different kind of world; the indeterminate moment with regard to reconstructing the world is an ethical and political strategy that acknowledges and registers the violence involved in well-intentioned endeavors to envision, project, and bring into being a well-defined alternative to the order of things. Similarly, the language of vulnerability and receptivity, which many commentators merely associate with passivity and a refusal to be engaged in the messy, contingent world, draws attention to the underside of overconfident notions of self, agency, and action. These are notions of the self or collective identity characterized by desires to control, determine and manage the proverbial Other, to assimilate, eliminate, or both assimilate and eliminate that which is opaque, dissonant, and unwieldy.

### Case

#### 4---Concepts of health and care are weaponized against blackness—doctors act out racial fantasies to inflict extra pain on black patients, resulting in actively bad care despite better available alternatives

Hoberman 12---John Hoberman is a Professor at the University of Texas, PhD UC Berkeley and is social and cultural historian who has researched and published extensively in the fields of race studies, human enhancements, medical history, and globalization studies. *Black and Blue: the origins and consequences of medical racis*

Over the past 25 years. The most prestigious American medical journals have produced massive evidence confirming that racially biased diagnosis and treatments are a fact of life in American medicine. These analyses document racially biased behaviors and if prompted one official investigation and no disciplinary proceedings. Other professionals serving the public, such as policemen or professors, are not granted such immunity from scrutiny of their professional conduct. The racially motivated habits whose effects are presented in the medical literature and statistical data are so ingrained that some doctors do not deviate from them even when they know their interactions with black patients are being recorded for observation. Their personal eccentricities and the specific harms they cause their patients remain anonymous, buried in the statistics that make it into print. Concealed behind the sterile terminology will racial “disparities” and “cultural differences” are an unknown number of biased behaviors that in other social venues might be regarded as negligence or violations of the law. What evidence do we have the doctors employee racially motivated thinking when dealing with patients of color? The abundant data that indicate differential diagnosis and treatment for a wide range of diseases and disorders are one type of evidence. Their crucial disadvantage is that they portray collective behavior rather than the more detailed scenarios of private professional conduct that do not appear in the medical literature. The motives for some physician behaviors can be deduced on the basis of what is known about the history of racialist thinking by physicians. Deductions of this kind are indispensable to understanding racially motivated medical thinking and behavior, given the dearth of current survey data about physicians racial thoughts and fantasies. But they are open to the objection that what we know about doctors racial complexes from the overt medical racism of the past may not apply to modern practitioners who have supposedly absorbed socially sanctioned disapproval of racist speech and behaviors and conduct themselves accordingly. This books methodology is based on the premise that, to the contrary, significant aspects of the medical racial folklore of the pre-civil rights have persisted and adapted to modern circumstances, to a greater extent than many have assumed possible in an age of officially mandated racial equality and racially civil public discourse. There is, in fact, no reason to assume that medical students and doctors are less likely to absorb and act upon the racial fantasies that still suffuse modern societies. In 2001, for example, 3 white medical students at the University of Alabama at Birmingham were exposed by the news media. After they were black face to a Halloween party. One was dressed as Stevie wonder, the 2nd is a character from the fat Albert cartoon show, and the 3rd as a black woman. The medical school officials who handled this case, with whom I communicated, resolve this matter by accepting public apologies and devoting a data racial sensitivity training. The idea that this behavior demonstrated character defects that might make these individuals unfit to practice medicine apparently did not figure in the process that finally certified them is fit to treat black patients. This incident also raises the question of where cultural stereotyping ends and biological race fantasies begin. Blackface signifies a fantasy of racial transformation, just as cross-dressing signifies a fantasy of gender transformation. These medical students found gratification in taking on the identities of a blind singer, a comical cartoon image, and the generic black female who is traditionally ranked at the bottom of our racial hierarchy. These future positions regarded playing with distorted versions of the black body is a kind of entertainment. One can only wonder what the experience of public humiliation and a day of racial sensitivity training may have done to temper or redirect their fantasies about black bodies in ways that might serve the interests of the African-American patients who will someday consult them for medical treatment. The most thoroughly documented racial disparities concerning the diagnosis and treatment of heart disease, the leading cause of death in the United States among Blacks as well as whites. This book argues that the medical folklore about Blacks and cardiovascular diseases that was so evident throughout the 20th century has distorted some doctors responses to heart disease in black patients. The absence of this historical perspective. In the current medical literature illustrates the naïveté of medical authors who regard racially differential diagnosis and treatment of heart disease is a mysterious phenomenon whose causes have somehow eluded our understanding. Reading our way back to the relevant medical publications and coronary disease will help to clarify the mystery. At this point. Let us survey. The findings about racially disparate treatment of patients requiring therapy for heart disease, that of appeared since the late 1980s. As of 1989 white patients were undergoing one 3rd more coronary catheterizations and more than twice as many coronary angioplasties as black patients. In 1993. Researchers confirmed that white patients consistently underwent invasive cardiac procedures more often than black patients. In a 1996 editorial in the new England journal of medicine, H. Jack Geiger expressed deep concern about the unequal treatment of heart disease: “perhaps most consistent-and most disturbing-are the repeated findings that Blacks with ischemic heart disease, even those enrolled in Medicare or free care systems are much less likely to undergo in geographically, angioplasty, or coronary artery bypass grafting.” A 1997 report came to similar conclusions regarding bypass surgery; the altar called this finding “disturbing, because we also found that they were not due to differences in the severity of disease or to coexisting illnesses.” A 2000 report confirmed that “medical therapies are currently underused in the treatment of black, female, and poor patients” who have suffered acute myocardial infarction. “This variation was not explained by severity of illness, physician specialty, hospital, and geographic characteristics”-- possible confounding factors. The study ruled out, leaving physician bias as the most probable explanation for why black patients were offered fewer therapeutic procedures. A 2005 survey of racial differences in the management of acute myocardial infarction covering between 1994 and 2002 found that racial differences and care had persisted rather than diminished during this period. Racially differential practices have also been found to affect the treatment of early-stage lung cancer. One research team wrote the following in 1999: “our analyses suggest that the lower survival rate among black patients with early stage, non-small cell lung cancer, as compared with white patients, is largely explained by the lower rate of surgical treatment among Blacks.” The same conclusion was reiterated in 2006: “black patients obtain surgery for lung cancer less often than whites, even after access to care has been demonstrated. They are likely not to have surgery recommended, and more likely to refuse surgery.” It is historically conditioned fear that causes some black patients to refuse surgery even when it would be in their best interest to consent. The medical literature refers to these decisions as examples of “patient preferences” as though these decisions to reject surgery were free and autonomous acts on the part of empowered medical consumers. In fact, black spheres of surgery persist because the medical profession is never address the consequences of its racist history and weight that might reassure African-Americans who feel strain from the medical system. Heart and cancer surgeries are generally regarded as desirable procedures that benefit patients, and that is why racially differential access to them is unjust. There are other kinds of surgery that are undesirable when better alternatives exist, and here too black patients have borne an extra burden of suffering. The effects of a hysterectomy, for example, are likely to be more of an ordeal for a black woman than for her white counterpart, since “black women are more likely to get the more invasive kind of hysterectomy, which doesn’t require a large incision. The vaginal operation is more expensive and harder, and studies have shown it is used more and women higher on the social economic scale.” It was reported in 1996 and 1998 that black patients with diabetes and circulatory problems were less likely than whites to have legs during surgery and are more likely to undergo the amputation of these limbs. Yet, precisely the reverse was true of the more beneficial type of operation, since Blacks were less than half as likely as whites to get hip replacements. Here, too, “patient preferences” dissuade some black patients from undergoing hip or knee surgeries because they “report less confidence in the efficacy” of such operations. Accepting such “patient preferences” as autonomous decisions is mistaken, since the black patients lack of confidence in the procedures is an expression of mistrust rooted in a group history of traumatic experiences involving the medical profession.